I find it impelling to write this piece because of what is going on today in our dear aviation sector.

As I spend some free time reading through write-ups in over four aviation online platforms on my handset, I feel somewhat low and downcast.

Only an unserious stakeholder will not be bemused at the unending mental gyration and the consequential bland and recycled stories and ideas therein.

Reflecting on the past six years on how we, as stakeholders in aviation, have contributed to the non-implementation of what we all applauded as “Hadi Sirika’s Aviation Roadmap”, I came to the obvious conclusion that the lessons of history on lost opportunities are totally lost on us.

While our country recedes to take the back seat in African and West African aviation development, we collectively and personally contribute to this ignoble decline.

Not reflecting on ourselves, we are quick to blame the authorities – Minister or the Government, absolving ourselves in the usual Nigerian hobby-horse.

Reflecting further, I could not but go back to my thirteen years in Nigeria Airways during which I worked under Nine CEOs/MDs, from AVM Abdullahi Dominic Bello (rtd) 1989 to Jonathan Jiya, 2002.

Over those years, there were outstanding Managements that made efforts to lift up the fortunes of the erstwhile National Carrier.

I remember how we fought some of those Managements, particularly those appointed from outside like Gana, Jani, Jones and Joji. While we literally rejected people like Jani, we were dumb over Agom and Ibrahim Jonathan because they were home-boys, even when we saw they did not fare better.

Although today, while many of my erstwhile colleagues seem not to remember, quite some do but differ.

What some others today remember is the ungazetted infamous Nwazota’s Report, the non-gazetting, of which was deliberate as the Obasanjo administration knew the unpardonable flaws in it because most of the allegations were wild, unsubstantial and therefore not prosecutable.

No doubt, there were some mistakes and incompetence, but rather than recognise them as such, Nwazota criminalised them.

Yet, it served OBJ’s purpose of an alibi to ill-advisedly liquidate the airline. That was the main purpose of the Nwazota’s Panel, a hidden agenda that gave birth to Virgin Nigeria.

Today, from among the “non-son of the soil” Managements, I begin with Jani Ibrahim, who ran the airline between 1997 and 1999.

I choose to start with Jani Ibrahim because, unlike the other CEOs, he ran the airline without any appointed Board and so depended on his colleagues in the Management.

The ideas, the vision, direction and leadership, all virtually emanated from him in an industry where he was, as it were, a “rookie”.

He understood this and so in critical issues, he involved the Management and relevant staff before escalating to the Minister for approval.

For instance, when Jani came up with his JV strategy, it was tabled and discussed exhaustively at two Management meetings where Cameroon Airlines, Ethiopians Airlines and Virgin were stepped down in favour of British Airways.

The final details of the JV were negotiated in the BA office at Heathrow by Salihu Bello and my humble self; General Managers Marketing and Public Affairs respectively.

The final details were now considered by the Management team and presented to the Minister, Late Dr.Olusegun Agagu all of who were in London, for approval. This was Jani’s approach.

The Jani Ibrahim “Turnaround Magic” of 1997/1999:

One of the great opportunities thrown away was in 1997/1999 when Alhaji Jani Ibrahim, an Oil and Gas industry professional with experience in Property Management was appointed the MD/CEO of Nigeria Airways.

Jani Ibrahim entered the aviation industry as an unknown quantity and a neophyte as it were.

Nobody knew his full background. He was considered by Airways staff as one of those unplanned pegs that the Government usually brought to the airline under “job-for-the-boys” syndrome.

Nobody had the foggiest idea about Jani’s vast business experience, nor his superior intellect.

Jani took over from Group Captain Peter Gana, a serving Air Force Officer, another “rookie” who took over from late Engineer Agom.

With Agom’s foreclosure of Joji’s Air Nigeria project and his return of the airline fully to the Ministry, the airline’s fortunes began a new decline. By the time he handed over to Gana, the airline’s challenges had mounted.

The debt profile, both domestic and external, had risen. Over-flight charges to ASECNA and ENESA had mounted, insurance premium unpaid and operational aircraft grounded or seized. Delays in staff salaries set in and pensioners were in the cold.

Nigeria Airways was no longer operating to London due to government policies and the airline’s debts.

This was Gana’s operating environment. The Airline had also lost its priced Ikeja Golf Course to a group of highly placed Nigerians both civilians and retired military officers who illegally secured a Certificate of Occupancy from the then Lagos State Military Governor, conferring ownership on them.

By the last week of Gana’s exit, the challenges of his inherited operating environment had snowballed into the strangulating dimension as the airline’s Insurance Broker – Alexander Howden had withdrawn its insurance cover which crippled all operations including the two last return Christian Pilgrimage flights out of Israel.

As the crises raged on, Peter Gana was removed and replaced with Jani. With severely contracted operations and mounting debts, and no planes flying, even Drucker would have shuddered.

Many a manager would have sought funding from the Government. But Jani did not. Rather, armed with a first-class Engineering degree and, most probably, one of the soundest minds that ever ran Nigeria Airways, he proceeded first with a painstaking study of the airline’s challenges so as to know the Achilles’ heels in the vicious cycle of the dwindling fortunes of the airline.

His first action was to keep the skeletal operations ongoing. He also quickly revamped the virtually Cargo operations and moved revenue from the paltry monthly sum of less than a million to an astronomical level.

Then, he invested the airline pension funds which had been left sitting with no accruing benefits. He then cut down travels, sought to expand cargo operations through leases and began debt negotiations, sometimes involving his Minister, Dr Agagu to achieve debt restructuring and reduction.

As at this time, Nigeria Airways was not flying to London due to debt issues and Abacha’s reciprocal sanction on BA that banned its operations to Nigeria.

Nigeria Airways was also not operating to New York, primarily due to the US ban on Murtala Mohammed Airport, citing safety issues.

So, unlike his predecessors, Jani had only Jeddah, a religious pilgrimage route. He then moved quickly to open up the now highly profitable Dubai route which no airline in Africa saw the business potentials then.

Jani now turned to his Management with a gospel of partnership with airlines – African and foreign that Nigeria Airways could reach a code-share or joint-venture arrangement to enlarge its market share and widen its revenue base.

Under consideration were Ethiopian Airlines and Cameroon Airlines. But before this could emerge from the drawing board, the plan suffered a setback. Jani was picked up by the Directorate of Military Intelligence over allegations of involvement in Abacha’s phantom coup.

Many believed that was the end of Jani, convinced that even if he was freed, he would not, as is usual, be allowed to return to the airline.

However, in the period of his absence, while one hawkish director, in fact, the most junior, pushed to replace him, the Management, now under Late Capt. Wilson Atabo in Acting capacity stepped up his joint venture idea and entered into a despicable arrangement with Bellview Airline, a domestic airline, to fly Nigeria Airways London route via Amsterdam.
The Agreement exposed the lack of knowledge and exposure of the Management to business negotiations.